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A brief glance at the current issue of The Colonial
Lawyer will show that the Lawyer's format, content,
and focus has taken on a new direction aimed at
serving the students, faculty, and alumni.
It has been painfully apparent in the last few years
that a change was long overdue. Some changes in the
right direction were made in the Spring 1976 issue, but
my staff and I felt that more were needed. After some
consultation and deliberation, we determined that a
student publication aimed at providing a liason
between students, alumni, and faculty would provide
the essential "raison d'être".
But more than just a dedicated editorial staff is
needed in order to achieve the desired goal. To be
a lasting success, The Colonial Lawyer needs full
cooperation, support, and contributions from all of
you, our readers: students, alumni, and faculty.
So you immediately say, "What does The Colonial
Lawyer offer me?" And 1 say, "A lot!" For example, it
provides a forum of general circulation for your ideas,
as well as a means of receiving informed feedback. But
that's not all. In particular, the students, alumni, and
faculty have a chance to publish many different types
of material in the Lawyer: short articles on legal issues
or topics, short stories, poems, cartoons, and other
items of general appeal. Moreover, the alumni get to
communicate to other members of the MarshallWythe community their recent achievements, honors,
distinctions, and newsworthy events. And the faculty
has an outlet for their views on current law school
programs, teaching methods or materials, and
innovations in legal education; as well as their views
on various controversial legal issues.
Of course, I have not outlined all of the services
that The Colonial Lawyer can provide its readers. The
ones noted above are only a few. But it must be
remembered that the editorial staff cannot do the job
alone. So PLEASE CONTRIBUTE, so that all of us can
receive the most that The Colonial Lawyer can give.
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RHETTA M. DANIEL, the current Editor- inchief of The Colonial Lawyer, received a B.A. degree
in English from the College of William and Mary in
1973. During her senior year, she was a member of
Kappa Delta Pi Honor Society.
Following her graduation, Ms. Daniel taught
English, speech and drama at King William High
School, and in 1974 she returned to the College to
work on her law degree.
Ms. Daniel is presently a Juris Doctor candidate at
Marshall-Wythe School of Law and expects to
graduate May 15, 1977. While at Marshall-Wythe, she
has been a member of the Student Bar Association,
American Bar Association, Mary and William Law
Society, and the staff of The Colonial Lawyer. She is
also a member of the Publications Council of the
College of William and Mary and of the Society for
Collegiate Journalists.
in addition to her law school activities, Ms.
Daniel has been employed as a law clerk and as the
Legal Assistant to the Vice President for Business
Affairs at the College of William and Mary. She lives in
West Point, Virginia, has two teenage children, and
plans to practice in the Richmond metropolitan area
following her graduation from Marshall-Wythe.
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OYEZ, OYEZ
NEW FEATURES have been included in this issue:
prose, poetry, humor, and alumni news. Many thanks
go out to those who submitted material for these
features.
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE ALUMNI are particularly desired for the next issue of The Colonial
Lawyer. Please send your news, articles suitable for
publication, and monetary contributions so The
Colonial Lawyer can continue to function as a liason
between the alumni and the law school. Plans for next
year include an additional feature spotlighting distinguished alumni with significant achievements in legal,
political, and other fields of endeavor.
THE COLONIAL LAWYER has its own office,
mailing address, and telephone number. The office is
located next door to the law school in 104 Rogers Hall.
Our mailing address is The Colonial Lawyer, MarshallWythe School of Law, College of William and Mary,
Williamsburg, Va. 23185, and our telephone number is
1-804-253-4686.
Please send all correspondence to the above
address and make out any checks of contribution to
The Colonial Lawyer.
SPECIAL THANKS go out to the Law School
Association for their gift of $200.00 to The Colonial
Lawyer and to the individual members of the alumni
who sent in their monetary contributions. Without this
type of support from the alumni, The Colonial Lawyer
cannot serve this segment of the Marshall-Wythe
community as only student issues may be funded with
the money allotted by The Publications Council.

THE FOLLOWING VISITING PROFESSORS will
be at Marshall-Wythe School of Law next year:
1. Professor Delmar Karlen of New York University, Tazewell Taylor professor, will teach Civil
Procedure. Professor Karlen is a former
director of the Institute of judicial Administration.
2. Judge Walter Hoffman, Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law, will teach a course in Federal
Courts. Judge Hoffman is presently director of
the Federal Judicial Center in Washington,
D.C.
He is a former member of the
Marshall-Wythe faculty.
3. Justice Paul Reardon, recently retired from the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, will
teach in the spring semester. Justice Reardon,
immediate past president of the Institute of
Judicial Administration, will teach Judicial
Administration and will lecture on Fair TrialFree Press.
4. Professor J. Rodney Johnson of the University
of Richmond is a graduate of Marshall-Wythe
and a former member of its faculty. He will
teach Trusts and Estates during the fall and
spring semesters.
5. Professor John Bridge of Exeter University,
who has taught at our Exeter Summer program
for several years, will exchange for the 1977-78
academic year with Professor Walter Williams.
He will teach International Law and a course in
the European Common Market.

CLINICAL EDUCATION is a new program added to
the curriculum at Marshall-Wythe this year. John Levy
is the Director of Clinical Education and the author of
the article on the program included in this issue of The
Colonial Lawyer.
Contrary to the national trend, 2369 APPLICATIONS FOR ADMISSION have been received to
date for 150 places in the Fall 1977 first-year class.

COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES for the MarshallWythe School of Law, The College of William and
Mary, are scheduled for 2 p.m. on Sunday, May 15,
1977 in the Phi Beta Kappa Hall auditorium. There are
148 candidates for graduation.

CYNDIE BASKETT, a rising second-year student
from Virginia Beach, has been appointed to the
position of EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of The Colonial Lawyer
for the year 1977-78. Her father, William C. Baskett, is
an alumnus of Marshall-Wythe and a director of the
William and Mary Law School Association.

OYEZ, OYEZ
Construction of THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS is progressing rapidly. The new center is located
adjacent to the site under preparation for the new MarshallWythe School of Law building. The locating of the National
Center for State Courts next to the Marshall-Wythe law school
site in Williamsburg promises mutual benefits to both National
Center and Marshall-Wythe School of Law community.

SITE PREPARATION FOR THE NEW MARSHALL WYTHE
SCHOOL OF LAW is under way. Groundbreaking ceremonies
were held on September 11, 1976, and there will be no delay
once the actual construction on the building is authorized to
begin.

THE NEW LAW SCHOOL BOND ISSUE is going to the
Virginia voters in November, 1977. All Virginia alums,
especially, take notice and VOTE IN FAVOR OF IT. Your
support of Marshall-Wythe at this critical time may make a
significant difference in the future success of the law school.

OYEZ, OYEZ
JUDGE SHIRLEY M. HUFSTEDLER, circuit judge
of the Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals,
will receive the MARSHALL-WYTHE MEDALLION
from Dean William B. Spong, Jr. at a law school
ceremony in Phi Beta Kappa Hall following the
completion of the Marshall-Wythe graduation
exercises.
The medallion is awarded periodically by the
faculty of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law to
persons who have distinguished themselves in the
legal profession.

HOMECOMING COCKTAIL PARTY - LIBEL
NIGHT-BARRISTER'S BALL. Students, alumni, and
faculty mark your calendars and attend all three of
these outstanding Law School events. The
Homecoming Cocktail Party, complete with an open
bar and scrumptious food, will be held after the
William and Mary Homecoming football game with
Rutgers University on October 29, 1977 from 4 'til 8
pm. Game time is set for 2 pm.
The Barrister's Ball and
Libel Night are
planned for mid and late March respectively. Please
contact the Student Bar Association, The MarshallWythe School of Law, College of William and Mary,
Williamsburg, Va. 23185 at the beginning of February
1978 for additional information and tickets.
A SPECIAL INVITATION is extended to all
alumni who have not attended these events since their
law school days. You won't be disappointed!

Judge Hufstedler, after having served in various
judgeships in California, assumed her present position
in 1968. She is a graduate of the University of Mexico
and Stanford University's Law School. In addition, she
has received honorary degrees from a number of
universities, including Georgetown, Tufts, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Southern California, and
Wyoming.
The Los Angeles Times has named Judge
Hufstedler "Woman of the Year," and Ladies Home
Journal has recognized her as "Woman of the Year in
Government and Diplomacy". She is the author of
several judicial papers and a member of the
International Association of Women Lawyers. Recently Judge Hufstedler was also chosen to serve on the
board of trustees for the Colonial Williamsburg
Foundation.
Last year the MARSHALL-WYTHE MEDALLIONS
were awarded to former Special Watergate prosecutor
LEON JAWORSKI and professor NORMAN ANDERSON of the University of London.

Law students who will soon be practicing law will
be interested in how the public perceives the legal
profession. The Virginia Bar Association, concerned
about mounting criticism of lawyers, some of it
flowing from the Watergate revelations, last year
commissioned Peter D. Hart Research Associates of
Washington to conduct a scientific survey of the
attitudes of Virginians toward the legal profession.
Approximately 600 Virginians, selected as a scientific
sample of the population in this State, were
interviewed personally in sessions lasting an average of
45 minutes. The results of these interviews were
computerized, analyzed and set forth in a 70 page
report. The report was released to the press and
discussed at the annual meeting of the association
earlier this year here in Williamsburg by a panel
headed by Dean Roy Steinheimer of Washington and
Lee.

HE LEGAL
AND PUBLIC

The survey reflected that Virginians, by a wide
margin (84 to 10 percent) agreed that lawyers perform
a unique and valuable function. 59% of those
interviewed said they would feel comfortable and
relaxed in a lawyer's office and 21% said they would
feel ill at ease, inferior and in fear of being taken
advantage of. Virginians disagreed with the statement,
"Most lawyers work only with businessmen and rich
people and don't seem to have time for people like
me," by a margin of only 53 to 43 percent. Yet they
also indicated by a substantial margin, 74 to 22
percent that "Once a lawyer took my case, I think I
would feel confident that he would give me a good
service as his bigger clients." And, also, by a margin of
67 to 16 percent said they would encourage rather than
discourage their child to become a lawyer.
One of the significant factors weighed in political
polls for incumbents is the level of confidence. The
level of confidence shown in various professions and
occupations in Virginia is indicated below.
Great Some Little. No
Confi- Confi- Confi- Confidence dence dence dence
%
%
%
%

Not
Sure
%

Doctors

58

33

6

2

1

Dentists

51

39

6

2

2

Accountants

34

37

6

2

1

Plumbers
Architects
Lawyers
TV newscasters
Members of local
city councils or
Boards of
Supervisors

25
22
19
16

49
38
49
49

15
9
21
24

4
4
5
7

7
27
6
4

12

42

25

11

10

•

a

When asked to suggest changes in the legal
profession, the most commonly volunteered suggestions were lower fees, improved quality of legal
service, higher standards of ethics and keeping clients
better informed. When asked to comment on the
disciplining of lawyers in Virginia, 6% of the
respondents said it was excellent; 29% said it was
good; 24% said it was fair and 14% said it was poor.
As to whether participation by lay members on
disciplinary bodies would help, 38% said it would be
an improvement; 15% said it would be worse and 31%
said it would be about the same. An interesting
statistic on a controversial subject within the legal
profession showed that 46% of the Virginians
interviewed said that advertising by lawyers would be
a good idea and 41% believed it would be a bad idea.
These figures represent only a smattering of the
statistical information provided by the poll and much
of that information is ambivalent. It would be fair,
however, to observe that the present public perception
of lawyers is such that legislative efforts to change the
nature of the legal profession might receive public
support or judicial decisions affecting the licensed
privileges of the profession might be applauded.
The Virginia Bar Association circularized the
survey to its membership, its committees, and to other
legal organizations in the State. It was determined that
in addition to the statistical information reflected by
the report it would be advisable to invite lay leaders to
discuss the more controversial questions raised by the
survey. Accordingly, in June the Virginia Bar
Association convened approximately 75 lay leaders of

The conference participants agreed that lay
persons lack the expertise to judge a lawyer's
competence and that incompetency of lawyers must
be policed by lawyers themselves. They did not appear
to favor peer review or recertification, but did believe
that mandatory continuing legal education with a
requirement of more than attendance and specialization with certification (now being done in California)
would be helpful. Also, there was general endorsement of an internship period prior to licensing where
both the ethical behavior and competency of the new
lawyer might be judged. A probationary period prior to
licensing is required in other professions as well as in
some European countries.

PROFESSION

Supreme Court opinions in the Virginia cases of

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 [1975], and
Bigelowe v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 [1975], were seen as

PERCEPTION

combining restraint of trade complaints with First
Amendment protection to presage holdings that would
render unconstitutional sections of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that prohibit advertising by
lawyers. Suits pending in Virginia in the Eastern
District were stayed to allow the American Bar
Association to amend its code. The Supreme Court of
Virginia has declined to adopt the amended code as a
rule. Three different attacks upon the code are now
pending in Virginia. At this writing it is difficult to
predict the ultimate disposition of these.

WILLIAM B. SPONG,

varied backgrounds from all over Virginia at the
Woodberry Forrest School and asked for their
comments on the disciplining of lawyers, lawyers'
fees, specialization, periodic recertification, mandatory continuing legal education and advertising by
lawyers. Jim Cox and Jeff Detwiler of Marshall-Wythe
were among the law students who helped record the
proceedings.
The conferees were asked if present measures to
discipline lawyers in Virginia were adequate to protect
the public and members of the profession. The
overriding response was that much of the problem is a
lack of public information. There is a need to make the
grievance process better known. Grievance committees should be made more accessible. A majority of
those at the conference felt that the disciplinary
process would be helped if there were lay participation
in the hearings.
It was generally agreed by the lay leaders that the
public does not understand the basis upon which
lawyers set their fees. Participants believed that the
lawyer should take the initiative in discussing fees at
the first conference with the client, and that
uncertainty over the amount can intimidate prospective clients and lead them to seek help from other
sources outside the profession. The conferees believed
that the best method for charging was by an hourly
rate with a full disclosure of rates at the initial
conference. Percentage fees and contingent fees were
condemned. It was suggested that many lawyers might
reduce their fees if they could reduce their overhead
by improving office efficiency.

Cont. page 24

William B. Spong, Jr., former United States
Senator, was appointed Dean of the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, July 1, 1976.
Dean Spong is no stranger to Marshall-Wythe. On
two prior occasions, he was a member of the law
school faculty: first, as Lecturer in Law, 1948-49; and
second, as Cutler Lecturer, 1975-76.
Dean Spong, a native Virginian, received his
education at Hampden-Sydney College, University of
Virginia, LL.B., and University of Edinburgh, Scotland.
His past achievements also include serving in both
houses of the Virginia General Assembly: House of
Delegates, 1954-55, and Senate, 1956-66.
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THE 1968 CONFIRMATION HEARINGS OF
JUSTICE ABE FORTAS
by Richard Dubin

On June 26, 1968, President Johnson accepted
Chief Justice Warren's decision to retire; "With your
agreement, I will accept your decision to retire
effective at such time as a successor is qualified."' The
same day, the President also submitted to the Senate
the nominations of Mr. justice Abe Fortas to be Chief
Justice replacing Chief Justice Warren, and Judge
Homer Throneberry, of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to be Associate Justice
replacing justice Fortas. Arising near the end of an
increasingly unpopular presidency and set off against a
background of political and social conflicts which
then divided our national culture, the nominations
precipitated Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings of
great historical significance.
Throughout the summer, the Judiciary Committee
held Justice Fortas' personal history, legal record, and
constitutional philosophy before the most powerful
magnifying glass ever used in such a hearing. For four
days, Justice Fortas sat beneath the frequently warm
reflection of the magnifying glass and testified
himself. Essentially a conflict between well spoken,
carefully organized advocates of judicial restraint and
conservatism on one side, and poorly organized forces
favoring liberal or moderate ideals and a greater
degree of activism on the other side, the Hearings
culminated in a failure of Congress to report favorably
on the nomination. Thus, while it was reported
favorably to the Senate floor by an eleven-to-six vote,
the conservatives sitting on the judiciary Committee
had gathered sufficient momentum during the
Hearings that talk of a filibuster to block confirmation
communicated the desired impact, and in September,
Justice Fortas requested that the President withdraw
his nomination?
Situated in the final year of Earl Warren's tenure,
the Hearings illuminate not only Abe Fortas' personal
qualifications and legal jurisprudence, but function as
a cogent manifestation of the idealogical conflicts
which marked the Warren era as a whole. Considered
in relation to many of the conservative dissents
delivered during the turbulent development of the

court's activist role, the Hearings provide a concise
and distilled representation of the struggle which
permeated this court's effort to define itself. A
statement contained in Senator Eastland's individual
views, filed as a part of Senate Judiciary Report,
furnishes an appropriate introduction to the bitterness
of this crucial struggle:
Unfortunately, it is apparent from the nominee's
performance as Associate Justice that he has joined
ranks with those judicial activists who have become so
overzealous in their obsession with the rights of the
lawless that they completely disregard the rights of
society; judges who have turned the temple of justice
into a criminal sanctuary: judges more concerned with
theories of sociology than sound principles of law. 3

The argument about the proper role of the
judiciary, as such erudite historians as Senator Ervin
would tendentiously proclaim, is as old as the nation,
going back to Marburg v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and extending through two
centuries of judicial debate. But as Senator Eastland
candidly stated, "This nomination cannot be considered in a void. It must be considered in light of the
turbulent times in which we live." Given our
historical perspective, it is still a serious mistake to
evaluate Justice Fortas' Confirmation Hearings exclusively either in terms of his immediate personal
qualifications or in a vacuum of conflicting legal
principles. Rather, the Hearings should be analyzed
against the background of a nation trying to cope with
the new realities engendered by the creation of a
"Great Society." The Hearings should be understood
in "light of the turbulent times in which we live; a time
which witnessed the unleashing of great racial and
individual tensions, spawned at least in part by earlier
Warren Court expansions of civil rights. As Senator
Eastland urged, the Hearings should be seen in the
context of a widespread national concern that such
developments as a rising tide of crime and proliferation of pornography signaled a disintegration of public
and private morals. More importantly the Hearings
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should be interpreted in light of the political climate
these social developments helped create. Against this
background, the Abe Fortas Hearings attain a symbolic
importance. For in many ways, they embody the exact
critical response to the Warren Court's active role and
its social progeny which had threatened this court
from its beginning.

C. Opinions of Mr. Justice Fortas reflect a
craftman's aversion for absolute rules, and a
profound awareness of the need to accommodate legal rules to the complexities of actual
life. 6

Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1966),
and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), are cited in
section A as examples of situations where Fortas found
the record inadequate for the purposes of reaching a
difficult constitutional question. In Wainwright, Fortas,
who wrote the majority opinion, Chief justice Warren,
and justice Douglas expressed their view that the
merits should not have been reached. In Rosenblatt,
Fortas alone found the record inadequate for the
purpose of a proper decision stating:

The deepest source of legislative concern
throughout the Hearings centered on the historical
debate between judicial activism and judicial
restraint. Naturally, Senators Eastland, McClellan,
Ervin, and Thurmond who formed the nucleus of the
conservative opposition went to great pains, as well as
length, to reassert the necessity of a judiciary which
would remain subordinate to the letter of the
Constitution. Yet, the factor which most fully
expresses the political climate of the Hearings is that
no one denied the validity of this theory. Perhaps
because other issues put Fortas on the defensive from
the beginning, he and his supporters did not attempt
to justify the legal theory involved in an activist court.
Thus when Chairman Eastland asked, "To what extent
and under what circumstances do you believe that the
court should attempt to bring about social, economic,
or political changes?", Fortas responded, "Zero,
absolutely zero."' The southern senators of course
were unable to accept the proposition that a justice
who generally sided with one of the most unrestrained
majorities in the history of the Supreme Court could
truly hold such a belief. Yet, consideration of the two
memoranda adopted by the Committee majority
strongly suggests that, at least in the case of Fortas, an
apparent contradiction between theory and practice
was susceptible to reconciliation.

Particularly in this type of case it is important to observe
the practice of relating our decisions to factual records
that serve to guide our judgement and to help us
measure theory against the sharp outlines of reality. 7

Section A closes with the observation that Fortas'
meticulous view of which cases are judicially ripe
provides the Court with "one of the most rigorous and
consistent voices for self -restraint in this important
area since the retirement of the late Justice Felix
F rankfurter.
" a

In Section B of the memorandum, another series
of decisions is introduced to demonstrate Fortas'
conviction that "the courts must not impose their
solutions to questions of policy either where the
question was suitable for legislative remedy or where
Cont'd. on page 12

Exhibit 45, "Judicial Restraint in the opinions of
Mr. justice Fortas," and Exhibit 47, "Memorandum Re
Judicial Performance of Mr. Justice Fortas," were both
presented by Senator Hart, leader of those forces who
supported the nomination. The first document seeks to
prove that Fortas' jurisprudence displays a respect for
judicial restraint, while the second paper attempts to
show that his decisions conform to such legal theory.
Exhibit 45 is subdivided into three equal parts. Each
part is preceded by a title which accurately
summarizes its respective content:

A. The opinions of Mr. Justice Fortas reflect a
meticulous concern that the Court confine
itself to cases in which the issues for decision
are properly presented.

B. The opinions of Mr. Justice Fortas reveal
passionate belief that the Federal Judiciary has
no monopoly on wisdom and virtue, and that
the judiciary must show a proper deference to
the roles of Congress, the Executive, independent administrative agencies, and the states.

Richard Dubin, B.A. Colby College, Waterville,
Maine, 1973; Candidate for juris Doctor degree,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, May, 1977. Home,
Worcester, Mass.
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Congress had manifested its will." In Steelworkers v.
Bouligney, 382 U.S. 145 (1965), Fortas' first opinion for
the Court presented a situation wherein the Justice
expressed sympathy for the purpose of the appellant's
suit but "declined to accomplish that result by judicial
fiat. w Here, the question of whether unincorporated
labor unions should be permitted to assume the status
of corporations for diversity cases was characterized as
"a decision suited to the legislative and not the Judicial
branch, regardless of our views as to the intrinsic
merits of the petitioner's argument." 11 In this section,
just as in the preceding one, the greater impact is
generated by a decision in which Fortas' assiduous
restraint is set off against the more relaxed standards of
his brothers on the Bench. In Federal Trade
Commission v. Dean Foods Company, 384 U.S. 597
(1966), a liberal majority of the Court headed by Chief
Justice Warren accepted the F.T.C.'s view that "it
should be enpowered to petition a federal court of
appeals to preliminarily enjoin consummation of a
merger under investigation by the Commission." 12
Writngfohmsel,JucHarnStwd
White, Fortas argued that the Court should not make a
grant Congress had frequently withheld: "The Commission should not be given such jurisdiction by fiat of
this Court. It should do what Congress intended it to
do. TheActisabusedwher ,asher ,it scont red
to confer jurisdiction where Congress has plainly
withheld it." 13

the state to accord jury trial for all but petty offenses,
"we automatically import all of the ancilliary rules
which have been or may hereafter be developed
incidental to the right to jury trial in the federal
courts
Concern for the states' right to experiment is
clearly revealed. In Fortas' interpretation of the
Constitution, a "federal union not a monolith" is set
up, and insofar as the loftiest standards of due process
will allow, the judiciary should allow "maximum
opportunity for diversity" and attach "minimal
imposition of uniformity of method and detail upon
the states."16
." 15

Further evidence of Fortas' belief in the efficacy
of a restrained judiciary is offered in the memorandum's assessment of his deference to the role of the
States. Here too, an instance of Fortas writing for a
divided Court is followed with another example of the
nominee's writing articulating stricter standards in a
dissent from the more active majority. In United States
v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 331 (1966), Fortas, writing for the
majority, declared that the Small Business Administration's interest in enforcing its own rules did not
override a Texas rule of law which rendered that
enforcement more difficult. Despite his personal
distaste for the coverture clauses attacked in the case,
his strict view of the U.S. Court's role led him to write:

Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), is
crucial because, like several cases discussed above, it
consists of four separate opinions which give tangible
form to the spectrum of constitutional philosophies
which characterized the Warren Court. At one
extreme, Justices Black and Douglas offer their
familiar argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states. Justice White, writing for his Brothers
Warren, Brennan, and Marshall, employs a more
restrained selective incorporation procedure. Justice
White finds that because trial by jury is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice, the Due Process
Clause incorporates that part of the Sixth Amendment
which requires trial by jury in federal criminal cases. At
the other extreme, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice
Stewart, rejects the internal logic of incorporation. He
delineates a more discriminating method of due
process adjudication which entails a gradual process
of judicial infusion and exclusion. This approach seeks
with "due recognition of constitutional tolerance for
state experimentation and disparity, to ascertain those
immutable principles . . . of free government which no
member of the Union may disregard." 17 Justice Harlan

Clearly, in the case of these SBA loans there is no
"federal interest" which justifies invading the peculiar
local jurisdiciton of these States, in disregard of their
laws, and of subtleties reflected by the differences in the
laws of the various States which generally reflect
important and carefully evolved state arrangements
designed to serve multiple purposes. id

The memorandum describes Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), as an even more persuasive
manifestation of Fortas' solicitude for the rights of the
states. In this case, Fortas concurred in the Court's
judgement that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment obligates the state to accord
the right to jury trial in prosecutions for serious
offenses. But he did not agree with the Court's
implication that by holding that due process requires

Cont'd. on page 21
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REFRESHING
RECOLLECTION
Class of '29
Judge Walter E. Hoffman, senior judge for the
Eastern District of Virginia and Director of the Federal
Judicial Center, will be teaching at Marshall-Wythe in
1977-78 as a visiting Tazewell-Taylor Professor of Law.

Class of '48
For the past 15 years, Ira Bernard Dworkin has
been honored by being listed in "Who's Who in the
East." He has served as Vice President of his local bar
association, trial counsel for the state child-welfare
agency and Acting Magistrate of Hunterdon County.
Presently, he is a referee on the New Jersey Worker's
Compensation Bench and conducts a private practice
limited to probate and real estate in Flemington, N.J.
He also teaches an evening adult education course
entitled "Sherlock Holmes Cross-Examined."

Class of '49
Walter Oden served as an intelligence officer for
the C.I.A. from 1952-72 in various Far East countries.
He is presently the Assistant Commonwealth's
Attorney for Norfolk, Va. and recently completed a
two year investigation which culminated in 101
indictments and the longest criminal trial in Norfolk's
history. Walter resides in Virginia Beach and is the
proud father of a four year-old, red-headed daughter
named Georgette.
Class of '50
The first editor of the William & Mary Law Review,
K. Harvey Chappell, JR., is now in the firm of
Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent, and Chappell in
Richmond, Virginia. He was one of the organizers, as
well as the first president, of the William & Mary Law
School Association. His outstanding accomplishments
in the legal field have included serving as the President
of the Richmond Bar Association; President of the
William & Mary General Society of Alumni, 8 years on
the Board of Visitors, 4 years as Rector; and Chairman
of the A.B.A. Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary which nominates federal judges. This
summer he will begin his term as the President of the
Virginia State Bar. In addition, he is on the Board of
Directors and General Counsel of Thalhimers Brothers,
on the Executive Committee of the Crippled Children's
Hospital, and an active member of his church.
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Class of '51

Class of '65

Bruce Lester was appointed judge of Division No.
1 of the 6th Appellate District of Kentucky on August
17, 1976 and elected to fill the balance of the eight
year term in last November's elections. He notes that
Virginia is not without representation in the Kentucky
Court of Appeals composed of fourteen judges, three
of whom graduated from Virginia law schools.

John Meagher is Minority Counsel of the
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives. He and his staff of sixteen provide
legal counsel, policy and technical assistance to the
twelve Republican Congressmen on the committee.
Another Marshall-Wythe graduate, Paul Auster,
joined the staff last year as a specialist in foreign tax
law.

Class of '52

William Joseph "Tocco" Sullivan became associated with Attorney Robert Mellon upon his discharge
from the U.S. Army. He served as Director of Connecticut's Vietnam Bonus Office for two years and is
presently Corporation Counsel for the City of
Waterbury in addition to his private practice. He is
married to the former Mary Lou Christiana and resides
in Waterbury with their three sons.

Robert E. Mellon has been practicing all phases
of law in Waterbury, Conn. since 1953. He is
associated with another alumnus, "Tocco" Sullivan.
Their office handles criminal matters, as well as
domestic matters, property closings, etc. He is married
to the former Judith Baker and they reside in
Waterbury.

Class of '67
Class of '55
Jerry Jebo is a partner in the firm of Dalton and
jebo in the general practice of law in Radford, Va. He
is the chairman of the Planning Commission of the City
of Radford and a member of the Board of Directors of
the Radford College Foundation and the New River
Legal Aid Society.

Nathaniel Beaman III lives in Norfolk and finds it
easy to keep up on the news at Marshall-Wythe since
his son, Chip, is a member of the first year class.

Class of '59
Theodore Bliss, M.D. and Fellow of the College
of Legal Medicine, is practicing in Norfolk. His main
interest is in the field of medico-legal law.
Class of '61
Allan C. Brownfeld resides with his wife and
daughter in Alexandria, Va. He writes a column
appearing three times a week in numerous papers
across the nation and participates in several other
journalistic endeavors. He also is a consultant to
several members of Congress and lectures throughout
the country for Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge,
Pa.

Class of '62
Peter Haynes White is still on all four corners of
White's Corners, Hopewell Jct., N.Y. 12533 or White's
Corners, Wappingers Falls, N.Y. 12590. He is a
merchant, and his corporation owns one store, a small
mail order business, and the family farm. White is the
chairman of the Beacon Merchant Association, the
director of the Howland Library Restoration Association, a Town and County Committeeman for the
Republican Party, and the Treasurer of the Town party.
He is currently the "designee" for County Legislator.
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Class of '68

Bradley K. Jones served four years in the U.S.
Army following law school graduation. He voluntarily
resigned from active duty in August, 1975, was
admitted to the North Carolina Bar by comity, and has
been a sole practitioner in Fayetteville, N.C. ever
since.

Worth D. Banner is an associate with the firm of
White, Reynolds, Smith, Winters and Lucas in Norfolk,
Va. He recently wrote the appellee's brief and
presented his first argument before the Supreme Court
of Virginia. The trial court's demurrer was sustained.

Fred Morrison left the Army after twelve years
service in the summer of 1975. He had served in the
Army JAG and spent one year teaching Criminal and
Constitutional Law at West Point. He is now an
Assistant Professor at the McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific, Sacramento, Ca. He is
teaching mostly criminal law related courses and will
be promoted to Associate Professor this fall. He has
four sons; the eldest, Bill, is a freshman in college at
University of Pacific.

Richard H. Harding was recently made a partner
in the 40-attorney San Francisco, Ca. law firm of
Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy. The firm specializes in the practice of labor law representing
management clients. Richard, his wife Sue, and two
sons live in Walnut Creek and enjoy the northern
California life style.

Class of '70
Michael M. Collins is a partner in the firm of
Collins, Wilson, Collins & Singleton in Covington, Va.
Stephen R. Crampton is a partner in the second
largest Vermont firm, Gravel, Shea, and Wright,
located in Burlington. He has served as Director of
Burlington Junior Achievement and Director and Vice
President of the Vermont Epilepsy Assn. His family
includes wife Susan, a practicing C.P.A., and two
children. He would be glad to talk to any graduates
about law practice north of the Mason-Dixon line.

Charles F. Midkiff was recently elected Secretary
of the Virginia Bar Association, Young Lawyers
Section. During the prior year, Chuck served as
Treasurer of the organization. In addition, he has been
reappointed to the position of Editor of the Young
Lawyers Section, Virginia Bar Association Journal.
For the last five years, Chuck has been associated with
the law firm of Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent &
Chappell in Richmond, Va.

Class of '73
Ed Miller works for the Vermont state legislature
preparing and amending legislation. He participated
in the first impeachment trial in over 200 years in
Vermont. He and his wife, Sarah, live in Montpelier.

George Wright has been a teacher at Monmouth
College since 1970 and is in private practice in New
Jersey since 1973. His is married and has two
daughters.

Class of '74

Class of 71

David G. Altizer became a partner with Gillespie,
Chambers and Combs of Tazewell, Va. on January 1st
of this year. He is the proud father of a daughter,
Carolyn Anne Riley, born on July 4, 1976.

After serving as a law clerk for the U.S. Court of
Claims in Washington, D.C. for one year immediately
following law school graduation, Nicholas J. "Nick"
DeRoma joined the legal department of the IBM
Corporation. He is currently a staff attorney, Office of
Counsel, General Systems Division, IBM Corporation,
Atlanta, Ga.

Kent R. Nilsson completed his Ph.D. in
Economics and Finance and established a consulting
firm for attorneys which prepares and presents
financial and economic evidence. He is living in
Charlote, N.C.
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Class of '75
Louis K. Campbell served briefly in the Army and
then as Asst. Commonwealth's Atty. of Botetourt
County, Va. Presently, he is in private practice in
association with E. C. Westerman, Jr. in his hometown
of Fincastie, Va.
Stanley C."Clint " Spooner is currently practicing
patent law with the law firm of Holman & Stern in
Washington, D.C. He and wife, Sandra, reside in
Alexandria, Va.
Class of '76
John L Carver is engaged in the general practice
of law with a three man law firm in Belfast, Maine. He
deals largely in criminal and trial practice with real
estate predominant in the non-winter months. Anyone
desiring information on the New England area should
contact John, Blake and Hazard, Belfast, Maine.
Richard M. Foard is engaged in the general
practice of law, as well as the practice of patent law, in
Hayes (Gloucester County), Virginia.
Robert B. Goldman is a registered securities
salesman with Shields Model Roland, Inc. in New York
City. He is handling retail customers, including estate
and trust business, as well as pension funds.
Unable to find a job with a firm or government
agency, Sharon A. Henderson opened up practice in
Fairfax County using her home as her office. Business
is improving every day and she's learning more and
more about the practice of law that they didn't teach
in law school. She's writing a section on "Marriage and
its Consequences" for a booklet on Women and the
Law in Virginia that is to be published by the Virginia
Women's Bar Association.
After graduation from Marshall-Wythe and passing the Bar in February of 1976, Everett P. Shockley
was employed by the law firm of Frith & Pierce in
Blacksburg, Va. In September 1976, he opened his
own general practice in Dublin, Va., where he is now a
sole practitioner.

Sandra R. Spooner is currently clerking for the
U.S. Court of Claims in Washington, D.C. She will
begin work as an attorney at the Department of Justice
in the Attorney General's Federal Clerk's Honor
Program in the fall.
In searching for graduation dates for this column,
we discovered several discrepancies between the
information supplied and our computer printout.
Please excuse any resulting error and assist us in the
next issue by including your year of graduation with
your information. It will be appreciated.

They thought it was murder.....

by Andy Thurman,

particularly mammoth volume with the legend
'Constitutional Law' etched on it's spine. Although his
clothes were expensive and clean, his appearence was
dishelved; there was a light stubble on his chin and
cheeks, his short hair was in dissarray, and he often
took off his horn-rimmed glasses and bit the ear-pieces
in frustration. He was an amateur criminologist and
first year law student, one John Smith by name, and on
the morrow he faced that most harrowing of all
experiences, the Constitutional Law exam. He was,
insofar as a naturally plegmatic nature can be, frantic.
He had chosen the lounge to study because it was
empty and quiet, yet, somehow comforting. The stack
of recent newspapers reminded him of a saner, if
equally depressing, world, and the constant hums and
clicks of the coffee, soda, and candy machines kept
him company. Only occasionally would another
sufferer ascend from the library and chat briefly.
Although the floor was quiet, three of the
other rooms were occupied. To the left of the
landing-lounge, Jack Riley, the third year law review
editor worked in the journal's office. To the left of that
room was the cubbyhole of the Women-in-Law
Organization; second year student Mary Lee studied
for her Trusts and Estates exam there. Across from that
was the office of Constitutional expert, Thomas Jeff,
who was up late diligently grading an exam. The last
room on the floor, the office of the law school's one
genuinely eccentric professor, Emerson Holmes Filler,
was empty.

NOTE: A tag line is necessary with this tale, as
with all others of it's genre. The characters may bear
some resemblance to real people, However, this
similarity is merely coincidental. Moreover, the events
are the "stuff that dreams are made on".
Lieut. Evers, Robbery-Homicide, sat across the
stained wooden table from the young man and stared
patiently at him. Around them vending machines
hummed; the several other tables in the small room
were newspaper-littered but empty. Yet there were
many other men about; men in the hallway outside the
room, men in the four adjacent rooms, and men on the
wide stairway that ended directly in front of the one
occupied table. Most of these men were in uniform.
The two, sitting men were outwardly calm, but the
tension produced by unusual events occuring in the
very early hours of the morning filled them even
though both were used to it. Lieut. Evers fetched a
small, weary sigh, shifted in his seat, and spoke,
"So tell me about it."
"Everything?" asked his companion, whose name
was John Quintus Smith IV.
"Everything," Lieut. Evers tiredly replied.
It was late at night, almost morning, and the
campus was lonely and deserted. The small law school
building was dark; only the library lights on the first
floor and the dim shuttered lights of the third floor
were on. The stairway inside the building was lit only
by the etheral red glow of the exit signs shining over
the landing doors.

John Smith's agonizings over Griswold v. Connecticut were interrupted by a step on the stair, and he

On the third floor the landing had been
widened and converted into a lounge with several
tables and vending machines. This room was
brilliantly lit but unpopulated except for a single man
sitting at a table facing the stairs with a pile of books in
front of him. He was reading intently from a

glanced up. The strain of exams had taken it's toll on
his usually unimpeachable self-control, for he allowed
the smallest quirk of distaste to twitch his lips. Coming
up the stairs towards him was Emerson Holmes Filler.
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Emerson Holmes Filler was a legend at the law
school. His father had been mildly insane, his
grandfather a raving lunatic, and many of his colleagues and students felt that he followed in their footsteps. He was a tall, lean man with beautiful
androgynous features and thick blond hair that peaked
several inches above his skull and fell in monumental
and skillfully arranged curls to his shoulders. He
invariably dressed in exquisite three-piece suits, silk
shirts and ties, and cowboy boots. He was one of the
country's leading experts on Constitutional Law and
was resented by his collegues and universally despised
by his first year students, including John Smith, whom
he cruelly tortured in Con Law between sips of
Hawaiian Punch, reputedly the only liquid he allowed
to pass his lips. He had had three heart attacks,
although he was only thirty. He was vain, pompous,
sarcastic, witty, and a bit of a boor. As he came up the
stairs John murmurred politely.
"Good evening."
Filler did not respond, but his glance fell on John's
open text and he gave a slight smirk. He walked on
past John, bought a cup of coffee, and went on into his
office. John paused for a moment, irritated by the
professor's manner, but then continued with his
studying. He had read but little, however, when Filler
reappeared and said preemptorily,
"I've spilled some of my coffee and need
something to wipe it up,"
John was annoyed, but he looked about him
helpfully. "This newspaper might serve." he suggested,
handing some to Filler.
The professor took it and started to go back to his
office, but then he paused. "Studying for my exam?"
he inquired.
John nodded. Fuller hesitated, then turned to go
back to his office. "I shouldn't worry about it too much
if I were you" he said almost kindly over his shoulder
as he went.

HE WAS A TALL, LEAN MAN WITH
BEAUTIFUL ANDROGYNOUS
FEATURES AND THICK BLOND
HAIR . . .
The suggestion did little to allay John's anxiety,
He studied for a bit longer before he decided that
Griswold was completely incomprehensible to him. He
determined to ask Riley, the law review editor, for
some assistance. Ponderously he got up; he was a big
man and had been sitting for a long time. Leaving his
book, he walked to the door of the law review office
and hesitated; he recalled that the one blight on
Riley's record was a failure in Constitutional Law. As
he paused, his gaze strayed idly down the hall. Filler's
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office door was open and the room brightly lit. John's
attention was caught by the odd position of the man
himself; he was sitting with his head on the desk at an
odd angle. Curious, John walked softly down the hall
and stopped in the open door.
Professor Filler was seated in his desk chair with
his head and shoulders asprawl the desk top. His left
arm hung down by the chair; his right forearm rested
on the desk with his hand lying on the bottom of the
page of an open textbook. John mechanically noted,
exams on his mind, that the book was the Con Law
textbook open to Buck v Bell. Over on a side table in
front of the couch was an empty coffee cup.

colleague, upstaged in his field by a younger man. And
finally Smith, first year student familiar with murder
and police procedure who despised Filler and was in
mortal terror of his Con Law exam. Opportunity:
apparently the only chance a potential murderer had
to do the deed was the brief period when Filler left his
office to get something to clean up the spilt coffee. If
Smith's testimony is reliable, which, of course, it is,
then Smith is out, as is Riley, who would have been
seen by both Smith and Filler going to Filler's office.
The other two are possibles. There you have it."
Evers smiled. "Thanks, Sherlock. I must admit
that I think I know you well enough to know that you
wouldn't kill over a law exam"

"Professor Filler?" he called softly. He went quiet
for a moment, listening. There was no sound of the
heavy breathing of sleep. Stepping gently, he walked
over to the desk.

"Well," John considered the proposition, "I
might, and I've never been a suspect before; but on
the whole I'm relieved you think so."

Very gently John reached across to Filler's throat
and laid his fingers lightly on it. There was no pulse.
John stood very still for a moment, looking slowly
around the room; then he turned and walked quickly
to the pay phone in the lounge. He called an
ambulance and the police. These officials arrived
quickly and soon announced their verdict. Professor
Filler was dead, killed by a massive overdose of
hyoscine, a heart depressant and eye medicine,
administered in his coffee.

"Do you know who did it?"
"I think so." John said, more seriously.
"Well?"
"It was suicide, of course," John smiled at Evers'
outraged incredulity, "for both of the reasons you
mentioned; the poison and the note."
"Elaborate, please." Evers growled.
"Well, poison is exactly what a man like Filler
would use. I told you he was vain; he wouldn't want to
mess himself up. But more to the point, there is the
Hawaiian Punch fixation."

"Well," said Lieut. Evers, "that was very vivid,
and helpful, I think you have a talent for third-person
description."

Evers groaned, "Of courser

"Thank you," John modestly replied.

"Exactly. If a murderer knew that Filler had a bad
heart, which was common knowledge around here, so
hyoscine would kill him, he wouldn't put it in a cup of
coffee, which Filler reputedly didn't drink, especially if
it wasn't on his desk. But what clinches it is the note."

"You also have a talent for stumbling across
murders. Are you going to solve this one for me or do I
have to do it myself?"
"I would be delighted to assist you, as usual," John
smugly countered. "Is there any way I can be of
service?"

"He didn't leave one." Evers was confused.
"Yes, he did." John flipped quickly through his
Con Law book and stopped at a case heading. "Buck v
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S.Ct. 584, 71 L. Ed. 1000 (1927)."
He passed it to Evers. "An interesting case. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Filler's namesake, you know, in the
opinion that was such a blight on his humanitarian
reputation." Evers looked mystified. "Filler had his
hand near the bottom of the page. There's a line there
I've marked."

Lieut. Evers chuckled, "Why don't you tell me
your theory of the crime?"
"Certainly," John began, a trifle pompously
"There are five possible suspects."

.

"Five?"
"Of course. Riley, Lee, Jeff, myself, and Filler.
No one else came by me on the stairs, assuming
my testimony is reliable."
"True," said Lieut. Evers, "but suicide is unlikely."

Evers traced down the page with his finger and
stopped at an underlined passage. He read it aloud,
sudden comprehension in his voice.

"Why?" John asked, mildly surprised at his
companion's sure tone.
"Poison is not the usual choice of male suicides,
and almost every suicide leaves a note. 98%. The
odds are strongly against it."

"Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
"Yes, indeed, or so Filler thought: grandfather,
father, and now him." John smiled in spite of himself.
"You know, I'm inclined to agree with him."

"Very well," John resumed, "to continue. Motives
for the four potential murderers: Riley, law review
editor, failed first year Con Law and had to repeat, he
hated Filler. Lee, second year female, had been seen,
once or twice, in perfectly innocent circumstances,
with Filler, and the gutter mind of the amateur
criminologist like myself leaps immediately to illicit
liasons and smouldering passions. Jeff, resentful

Andrew Thurman, B.A. in Classics, Columbia University, May.
1976. Member of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, class of 1979. Coeditor of the Amicus Curiae for 1977-78.
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ABE FORTAS (cont. from p. 12)

the area of subversive activities, Fortas entertained
precepts "some might consider 'old fashioned'." Here,
he declined to reach the constitutional issue raised by
Black and Douglas, adhering instead to the majority
view that Communists prosecuted for filing perjured
affidavits "could not defend their false statements on
the ground that the statute requiring such affidavits
was unconstitutional." 22

notes that such a strict approach was followed through
the nineteenth and most of the present century.
A review of the historic struggle to find the
appropriate standards for defining due process and
fundamental fairness is beyond the scope of this
article, but it is sufficient for present purposes to say
that the opinions of Black and Harlan depict the outer
parameters of the debate. It is interesting to note,
therefore, that Justice Fortas' opinion does not
gravitate to either extreme, but rather stakes out a
moderate middle ground. While the majority
selectively incorporates and Black urges absolute
incorporation, Fortas resists the trend of rigidly
imposing the exact pattern of federal proceedings
upon the 50 states. He concludes that such federal
requirements as unanimous verdicts or a jury of twelve
"are by no means fundamental--that they are not
essential to due process of the law--and that they are
not obligatory on the States.""

Thus far, discussion has centered around cases
noted by Judiciary Committee supporters of Fortas,
but generally ignored by his protagonists. There is,
however, another body of decisions seized by the
nomination opponents to demonstrate that Fortas is
one of those judicial activists who, in Senator Ervin's
words, "toy with the Constitution as if it were their
personal plaything instead of the precious inheritance
of all Americans." 23 This group of cases includes four
categories which attracted special concern: criminal
procedure, subversive activities, pornography, and the
State-Federal relationship.
As might be expected, Fortas' role in the Warren
Court's pioneering criminal justice developments
provoked the most vituperative attacks. United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Derma, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
and most importantly Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), were typically credited with creating
artificial rules of evidence outside the scope of the
intentions contemplated by the original framers of the
Constitution. In discussing these four decisions,
Senator Ervin summarized the constitutional and
social policy arguments leveled against Fortas' work in
this area of criminal justice:

Section C of the memorandum completes the
review of Fortas' judicial restraint with an examination
of his aversion for absolute rules. Fortas has given no
comfort, the report states, "to those who hoped he
would subscribe to the broad absolutes which have
characterized many areas of the Court's work." 19
Rather,svld"ubteyanwr-lik
preference for moderate positions which have been
wholesome additions to the Court."20 In support of
this proposition, Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968), involving extension of the one man, one
vote rule to local government, is cited. Here, Fortas
argued that the Court should abstain from deciding the
issue until the Texas courts had presented their "final
product" for approval. His underlying purpose is again
the rejection of a "rigid, theoretical, and authoritarian" approach to local government problems:

These newly created rules are repugnant to the words
and history of the fifth and sixth amendments upon
which they are allegedly based, and permit multitudes
of murderers, rapists, burglars, robbers and thieves to
go unwhipped of justice. In the final analysis, these
decisions rest an the strange assumption that society
needs little protection against criminals, but criminals
need much protection against law enforcement officers. 24

In this complex and involved area, we should be careful
and conservative in our application of constitutional
imperatives, for they are powerful It is our duty to
insist upon due regard for the value of the individual
vote but not to ignore realities or to by-pass the
alternatives that legislative alteration might provide. 21

Ervin's language has its roots in the belief that the
maintenance of public order and the protection of
person and property that it entails is a fundamental
priority of government. At the time of the Hearings,
the incidence of civil disorder approached previously
unknown levels of . intensity. The Watts holocaust, the
widespread riots of the summer of 1967, the massive
unrest which followed Martin Luther King's assassination, and the violence surrounding the contemporary
Democratic Convention all were etched clearly in the
minds of Ervin and his committee allies. Moreover, the
rising crime rates which every large city in the nation
experienced reinforced the argument that the restoration of law and order was a paramount concern of the
general public. Thus, the basic complaint thrust
against Fortas was that some of the decisions he had

This aversion to overly simplistic rules, fashioned
by majorities he sometimes found too unrestrained, is
also reflected in the areas of criminal procedure,
antitrust, subversive activities and libel of public
officials. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1968); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1%8); and United States v. O'Brien, 376
F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), are all presented as examples
of Fortas' preference for moderate positions in the field
of criminal procedure. Each case in the series involved
framing approval of governmental procedure with
carefully prescribed conditions. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), is set forth as proof that in
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Ervin and Thurmond also denounced the tendency of cases like Miranda to let murderers and
rapists "go unwhipped of justice," to put them back on
the street without rehabilitation. The memorandum
sharply disputes this assessment: 27

ABE FORTAS (cont. from p. 21)
helped formulate retarded this restoration. Following
this critical approach, Senator Thurmond attacked
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because it
freed a twenty-three year old man who had confessed
to the kidnapping and rape of an eighteen year old girl.
As Thurmond interpreted the five-four decision, it
"completed the destruction" of voluntary confessions
in criminal cases. Justice White's strongly worded
dissent was carefully noted: "In some unknown
number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a
rapist, or other criminal to the streets and to the
environment which produced him, to repeat his
crime."'

The Miranda case itself and its three companion cases,
Westover, Vignera, and Stewart, dramatically illustrate
the aver-statement of the "need" for confessions in law
enforcement. All four of these defendants have been or
will be retried even though the confessions they made to
the police are no longer admissable in evidence. Two of
four defendants, Miranda and Westover, have already
been retried and convicted of the same offense for
which they were originally charged, and have received
the same sentences originally imposed. 28

Finally, the memorandum notes that, while the five
man majority reached a decision on the issues here,
the Court remembered its own role in our Federal
system, and "specifically invited the Congress to enact
appropriate legislation dealing with confessions and
police interrogation." 29

Fortas emerges as an
unfortunate pawn caught
between conflicting

The reason that Fortas' record on the Bench was
treated superficially and occasionally arbitrarily is
enshrouded in the political mist which hung thickly
over the Hearings. Out of this haze of conflicting
political pressures, certain assumptions may be drawn.
First, it seems clear that the Fortas critics were obliged
to give expression to their constituents' dissatisfaction
with the effect of the Warren Court's impact on
American life. A primary concern of these critics was
to act as alter ego for the public they represented and
to articulate the fear and distrust of this Court's
pioneering developments in criminal rights, obsenity
adjudiciation, and other controversial areas. Consideration of the scope of this criticism inexorably leads
to the conclusion that this distrust and dissatisfaction
was directed primarily at the Warren Court as a whole.

ideologies
At this point, reference should be made to the
second exhibit introduced into the Record by Senator
Hart, a document entitled "Memorandum Re Judicial
Performance of Mr. Justice Fortas." Here, the
advocates of Justice Fortas directly confronted the
criticism aimed at specific decisions. Since Fortas
acted in accordance with a tradition established by
Frankfurter and would not express his views about
these particular cases, the memorandum furnishes
what may be classified as a hypothetical justification
of Fortas' participation in them. The memorandum
particularizes "four relevant considerations" about the
Miranda decision which the Fortas defenders felt were
not adequately recognized by Thurmond, Ervin, or
their allies.

Fortas' record did not lend itself entirely to
inclusion in this broad object of attack, but the
opposition was composed of men extraordinarily
adept at manipulating political advantages. These men
innately sensed a vulnerability in the Fortas nomination. From the beginning they seemed to realize that
the rising tide of sentiment against the progressive
changes wrought by the Warren Court would coalesce
with the doubts surrounding the nominee's close
relationship to President Johnson and afford them an
opening. In this scenario, Fortas emerges as an
unfortunate pawn caught between conflicting ideologies. He was not the judicial extremist characterized
by the opposition, but since he was not the
conservative, tradition oriented man they yearned for,
he was castigated for his views. Fortas' judicial record
may have warranted his nomination for Chief Justice,
but other issues, primarily his personal history,
provided the opposition with the seeds of resistance.

First, it is aimed that the extent to which the

Miranda decision was a departure from existing law
was greatly exaggerated. Chief Justice Warren's
opinion for the Court is quoted to demonstrate that
"the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an
exemplary record of law enforcement"' while using
essentially the same warnings required by the majority
in Miranda. Additionally some state supreme courts
had already come to the same conclusions about what
Due Process required before the Miranda decision was
handed down. In any event the memorandum
continues, "When Justice Fortas came to the Court,
Mallory, Escobido, and other cases had already been
decided, foreclosing some of the possibilities that
might otherwise have been open to him."

Cont. on page 24
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MERE RATIONALITY WITH BITE
A law professor's warranty,
whether express or implied,
Extends to the student
who has reasonably relied.
To study legal writing,
Torts, or Contracts,
A student must do more
than mere finding of facts.
Who is this enigma,
this reasonable man,
Whose conduct we must emulate
or act better than?
Formalities of law school,
"yes, sir " and "no, ma'am,"
Are not the best equipment
to pass the bar exam.
The library regulations,
no smoking, eating, or drinking,
Are effective preventions
of concentrated thinking.
In the dead of winter,
amid sniffles and sneezes,
All of us have learned
about the loathsome diseases.
Between textbooks and hornbooks
supplied by Mr. West,
With our Gilberts and Marty-Z's,
most will pass the tests.
Law school, however,
is not as bad as it seems,
For being attorneys
is in all of our dreams.
Cyndie Baskett
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ABE FORTAS (cont. from p. 21)

LEGAL PROFESSION (cont. from p. 9)
How did the lay leaders of Virginia feel about
advertising by lawyers? The report on the conference
stated: "While there was a general reaction against
aggressive advertising by lawyers to promote the use of
their services.... , there was general agreement that
much more communication and information was
needed to match the client with the proper attorney to
handle his particular problem and make the public
aware that legal services are needed in certain areas.
Present conditions leave the public in a state of
ignorance...." There was no strong desire to see fees
advertised, but the conferees did believe that there
should be law lists available to the public that give the
lawyer's name, background, experience, specialty and
representative clients.

These other factors were skillfully developed and
eventually enabled the opposition to gather a
momentum which made the inadequacies of their
critism of Fortas' jurisprudence less noticeable. In the
fall of 1968, the opposition reaped the harvest they
had worked for over the long summer - Fortas, the
moderate activist, was forced to withdraw.
FOOTNOTES
1. Letter from President Johnson to Chief Justice
Warren dated June 26, 1968. Collected in The
Supreme Court of the United States Nominations:
Hearings and Reports on Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme Court Justices
by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1916-1972,
Volume 9 A ( hereinafter cited as Hearings ).
Compiled by Roy M. Mersky and J. Myron
Jacobstein, Buffalo, New York, 1975, page 383.

Hugh Patterson, the Norfolk lawyer who along
with John Ryan, an adjunct on this faculty, directed
the taking of the Hart Survey and organized the
Woodberry Forest Conference, has concluded that "a
shroud of skepticism covers the profession." It is that
skepticism that law students as well as practicing
attorneys should understand. Has the nature of the
legal profession and of legal education resulted in an
abundance of practitioners who are insensitive or
unaware of public concerns, or unaware of the
professional restraints placed upon them in consideration of the licensed privilege of monopoly?
There is evidently a wide gap of understanding
between what the average lawyer sees as his or her role
and duty, and the public perception of whether that
role and duty are being fulfilled. As much as we in the
profession may relish the mysticism of our language
and the elitism of our calling, there is an evident need
to provide the public with information about what we
do and why, where and how to select a competent
attorney and to assure that the products of our law
schools and those in the practice are both ethical and
competent.
The implicit warnings of the Hart Survey and the
Woodberry Forest Conference are not new. In 1965,
Justice Lewis Powell, then President of the American
Bar Association, speaking on The State of the Legal
Profession said: "The bar enjoys the privilege of
self-discipline but along with this privilege there is a
commensurate responsibility to protect the public
from attorneys who are unworthy to practice."

2. W. Swindler, Court and Constitution in the 20th
Century (1970) at 339.
3. Hearings, "Report," at 19.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 8.
6. Hearings at 1110, 1111_
7. Id, at 1110.
8. Id. at 1111.

24. •Id. at 39.

9. Id.

25. Id. at 41.

10. Id.

26. Hearings at 1115.

11. Id.

27. Id.

12. Id.

28. Id. at 1115-1116.

13. Id.

29. Id. at 1116.

14. Id. at 1112.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 155 (1968).
18. Id. at 175.
19. Hearings at 1112.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1113.
23. Hearings, "Report," at 39.

Richard Dubin

William B. Spong, Jr.

The following sentence was lifted verbatim from a recent recruitment letter:
Again, I am looking for currently available applicants, law students, and people who will be
graduating in May or June.
"Yes, Virginia, there is a difference."
A
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Amicus Subscriptions

THE MARY AND WILLIAM LAW SOCIETY
The Mary and William Law Society, an organization at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, was
recently formed for the purpose of focusing upon legal
issues and areas of interest which are of particular
concern to the women at the Law School.

(LAW SCHOOL NEWSPAPER)
The Amicus Curiae is now soliciting subscriptions for the 1977-78 academic
year. Subscription cost for graduating students is $7.50 per year. The price of a
subscription will otherwise be $8.00. To subscribe, complete this form and Send
the detached version to the Arnim: Curiae, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
Williamsburg, Va. 23185. Graduating students should drop off the form in the
Amicus Curiae box in the Law School office.

Last spring, the Society co-sponsored the First
Annual Virginia Law Women's Symposium ("Women
Talking About Law: Getting In, Getting Out, and
Getting On") with the women's groups at the
University of Richmond and the University of Virginia.
This year's Symposium, entitled "Sexual Assault:
Psychological, Judicial, and Legislative Perspectives,"
is being sponsored by the Society and will be held at
the Law School on Saturday, April 16, 1977.
Although the Mary and William Law Society is
open to all law students and faculty, the present
membership is entirely female. The Society sponsors
monthly speakers' programs and occasional social
events to which all members of the law school
community are invited.

SALLY ANN O'NEILL, this year's president, is a
juris Doctor candidate for May, 1977. She graduated
cum nude from Elon College (North Carolina) in 1970,
receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in Social Science,
and from Memphis State University in 1972 where she
received a Master of Arts in Political Science.
Sally has been working as a law clerk in the Office
of the Chief Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Langley Research Center in Hampton,
Virginia, and upon graduation, plans to practice law in
Dallas, Texas.

Name
Address

Amount Enclosed

Please 0111 Me

BLACK AMERICAN LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION

WILFORD TAYLOR, Jr., present chairman of BALSA,
received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business
Management from Hampton Institute in 1972. While at
Hampton, he served as director of a comprehensive
drug abuse prevention program which was financed by
a grant from the U.S. Office of Education. He was
executive director of the Hampton institute Crisis
Intervention Center and Peninsula Drug Abuse
Training Institute and received a certificate from the
Drug Dependence Institute at Yale University.

The Marshall-Wythe Chapter of the Black
American Law Students Association (BALSA) is now in
its fourth year. BALSA is a small but diverse group of
minority students dedicated to the development of
professional competence in the field of law and united
by two broad goals: the minimization of extraneous
obstacles to individual achievement in the law
program and the maximization of minority input into
the American system of jurisprudence. Membership in
BALSA is by voluntary association and in compliance with guidelines established from time to time.
Officers of BALSA are elected for a one year term. This
year's officers are Wilford Taylor, Chairman; Bryan
Milbourne, Secretary; and Carol Grant, Finance
Officer.
BALSA has been privileged to work with other law
school and college groups this year. In an era of
painfully limited resources, BALSA has stressed the
necessity of inter-group cooperation and reinforcement. We anticipate that this cooperation will
continue.
Realizing that the law school administration cannot be responsive without input, BALSA continually
strives to identify and elucidate the particular concerns of black students at the school. Financial woes
still threaten completion of a three year term for many
of the group's students. Minority recruitment has not
yet pushed black enrollment beyond the 4% level, and
the absence of a black professor from the MarshallWythe faculty does not carry positive connotations.
These lingering, prickly problems will be tackled
afresh each year until they are resolved.
BALSA measures its vitality by the participation of
its members. Consequently, the organization has
sponsored or endorsed a broad spectrum of activities
throughout the academic year. These activities have
been characterized as "total law exposure on a
shoestring."
The year began with a picnic style orientation
program for first year students. SBA and BALSA
members fielded the neophyte's questions with the
authority and finesse that are common among
upperclassmen. BALSA's next event was a reception
for William and Mary's black undergraduates. The
reception provided an opportunity to make acquaintances and to identify prospective Marshall-Wythe
students. In November, BALSA sponsored a topical
symposium on the delivery of justice. Panel members
included a judge, prosecutor, public defender, and
academician_ In March, BALSA sponsored a day-long
juvenile law symposium. The two panels of the
symposium were comprised of recognized specialists
in the field of juvenile law. The year's activities
culminated with a farewell reception in April for
BALSA's graduating students.

Mr. Taylor received a master's degree in Finance
and Economics from the University of Richmond in
1975. He enrolled in Marshall-Wythe where he expects
to complete requirements for the Jurus Doctor degree
in 1978. Mr. Taylor has served as a student representative interviewing prospective faculty members. He has
participated in the post- conviction project and will
work as an intern with the Hampton Commonwealth
Attorney's office during the summer of 1977. He plans
to settle in the lower peninsula area of Virginia.

26

INTERNATIONAL LAW SOCIETY

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW GROUP FOCUSES

This year the Marshall-Wythe International Law
Society experienced its greatest increase in membership since its inception four years ago. This increase is
not surprising since the ILS has been extremely active
this year. Ten lectures and cocktail parties have been
sponsored or co-sponsored by the ILS, have increased
the exposure of Marshall-Wythe students to practitioners and scholars of international law, and have
permitted firms, governmental agencies, and international organizations to meet prospective future
associates.
This year's regular series has included discussions
led by various distinguished speakers, a panel
discussion at Virginia Institute of Marine Science, and
lectures. The various speakers came from the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, U.S. State Department,
United Nations, private industry, CBS News, and
Washington, D.C. law firms.
Four officers have guided the ILS this year in its
efforts to meet the interests of the William and Mary
law students. They are Patrick McDermott, President;
Wally Kleindienst, Vice-president; Tim McDormott,
Secretary; Sarah Slesinger, Treasurer.

ON PUBLICATION, AND SPEAKERS

PATRICK McDERMOTT, this year's president, did
his undergraduate studies at Montclair State College,
The Sorbonne, and the Royal Conservatory of Music
and received a Bachelor of Arts in French.
Mr. McDermott is a candidate for a Juris Doctor
degree at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law in May
1977. He will practice law with a firm in Hampton
following his graduation from Marshall-Wythe.

The growing awareness of the necessity of
balancing the technological needs of modern industrial society with the natural and human environment
has resulted in an ever-increasing number of federal,
state, and local regulatory programs and statutes,
ranging in scope from the management of the coastal
zone to the protection of endangered species. These
regulatory programs and statutes, coupled with the
litigation which has resulted from them, have made
environmental law one of the fastest growing areas of
the legal profession.
The Environmental Law Group is composed of
students interested in new developments in environmental law. The activities of the Environmental Law
Group center on two major areas of concern. The first
of these is the publication of the Environmental
Practice News, a review of recent developments in
environmental law written especially for the practicing
attorney. The articles comprising the Environmental
Practice News are written by members of the Environmental Law Group and strive to present a balanced
view of new legal developments in the field.
The second major activity of the Environmental
Law Group is the sponsorship of a speaker's program to
promote the discussion of important issues in environmental law. Past speakers have included representatives from law firms, government, and industry, and
often their lectures have sparked lively exchanges
between speaker and audience.

STEVE ORMOND, President of the Environmental
Law Group, graduated with honors in 1974 from
Michigan State University where he received a B.A.
degree in International Relations.
Mr Ormond entered Marshall-Wythe in 1974 and
expects to receive a Juris Doctor degree on May 15,
1977. His law school activities have included
membership in the Law School Christian Fellowship,
Environmental Law Group, and on the staff of The
Colonial Lawyer editorial board. Also, Mr. Ormond
has worked as a Law Library Assistant.

law schools are truly graduate schools, then let them
compete in the intellectual arena with other graduate
schools (e.g., political science, history or sociology)
without the overwhelming advantage of holding the
keys to the Kingdom of Practice.

CLINICAL
LEGAL
EDUCATION

The debate would take on quite a different cast if
the burden of proof was shifted from those attacking
the citadel, to the law schools themselves to justify
why the traditional entry requirements, teaching
methods, courses and length of legal education should
be the prerequisites for admission to the bar. The
illogic of the burden in the present debate (which is
often the case in movements against the status quo) is
that for what appear to be unjustifiable historical
reasons law schools now sit virtually alone in the
middle of the road to the practice of law and insist on
framing the debate in terms of convincing them to get
out of the way or at least move over. This is, of course,
a very natural conservative reaction, but "stonewalling" is not an appropriate response.

Practical Experience
Before Graduation
The student comes into my office. "Do you have a
minute? I want to do third-year practice." For the next
fifteen minutes we talk about the course requirements
in Virginia for third year practice; what courses are
offered in which there's a chance that one might
actually practice in court; and what other ways there
are to get practical experience before graduation. This
scenario was repeated numerous times. It raised for
me two questions. First, what law students and others'
think is needed from legal education which is not now
being provided. Second, within the realities of law
school and law practice, what can be expected.
The underlying issue has been there since the
birth of law schools as we know them today and has
been most often articulated as to whether law school is
a trade school or a graduate school.' This internal
tension has its genesis in the history of law schools and
their struggle for both hegemony over access into the
profession and a secure and respected place within the
academic community3 The campaign to acquire both
the monoply and respectability was long and hard
fought 4 and appears to have left legal education with
an innate hostility and disdain for those aspects of law
which deal with practice. Legal education's position
has been that most of those "practical" aspects must
be left to the bar since law schools do not hold
themselves out to be "lawyer schools".'

The traditional law school position set out above
does not accurately represent most law schools' recent
stance. They have in the last ten or so years focused on
clinical education as at least a partial response to these
challenges. In addition to the debates outlined above
and the millions of dollars the Ford Foundation has
funneled into clinical programs through the Council
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility,
(CLEPR), there are at least four other factors
which I believe have given impetus to clincial
education. First, the usual (and I think often
inapposite) model of the medical profession is readily
available. One would not want to be operated on by a
surgeon who had never in the course of his medical
education been in an operating room, or seen an
operation, much less, actually performed one, but had
learned how to operate by classroom instruction and
then, after graduation, by the experiential method of
performing operations and then (hopefully) first
recognizing and then learning from his mistakes.
Medical education has a large clinical component to
deal with the needs of the practice of medicine and,
therefore, so should legal education.

It is my position that if law schools "do not hold
themselves out as lawyer schools" then there is very
little reason why their diploma and the final law school
exam, i.e., the bar exam, should be the prerequisites
for becoming a lawyer. If the law schools can or will
not shoulder a substantial part of the burden of
assuring that lawyers have at least a bare minimum
level of competence to practice law, then there is little
justification to bestow upon them the entire benefit of
having a monopoly on the access to that practice. If

By John Levy
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After graduation our students will be plunged into a
welter of impressions, processes, roles and obligations.
The most important questions they will face will not be
concerned with the coherence of doctrine or the skill of
case analysis, but with making sense of this experience,
of coping with it, understanding it and growing within it,
in the context of the particular professional role they
have chosen to perform. The breadth, depth, and
applicability of this understanding will be a function, in
large part, of whether and how they have learned to
learn. 1 3

Clearly, there seem to be a great need by and for
law students to "conceptualize the way in which they
(as an individual) shall become working lawyer-professionals."'" The clinical methodology, i.e. the students'
assumption and performance of various roles within
the legal system and the use by the teacher of this
experience as the subject and focal point of
intellectual analysis, 15 provides the student a
structured context within which he or she receives
feed-back and constructive critical evaluation of his or
her functioning as a lawyer. This will most likely be the
only time in their professional lives when this is
available to them. This process is both intellectually
and emotionally challenging.
The traditional subject matter of clinical legal
education - interviewing, counseling, negotiating,
advocacy, etc. - provides not only knowledge about,
and practice using, much needed and desired skills,
but the context within which very basic concerns can
be raised. The learning which takes place in the
clinical context appears to be on a different level than
cognitive (theoretical) transmission of knowledge and
ways of analysis. The clinical experience is integrative,
in that substantive legal knowledge, analysis and

Second, the accutely felt need of law students to
acquire some of the mundane skills and knowledge to
ease their transition into the profession has combined
with the malaise of the second or third year to create
great pressure for clinical courses. The consensus as to
the value of the case method after the first year fell
apart long ago. In the mid-30s a survey of Harvard
Law School students found that they thought the case
method should be dropped after the first year! Jerome
Frank posited that the case method's goal of teaching
one to "think like a lawyer" could and should be
accomplished within six months. 8
Third, the social activism of the last 10 or 15
years, laced with a dose of anti-intellectualism, has
forced much of academe including law schools to deal
with practical problems (or, if you will, reality). The
legal manifestations of this activism such as the right
to counsel cases9 and the poverty law-legal services
movement," has opened up areas of practice which
lend themselves to field work by law students in
clinical courses.
Finally, the theoreticians of the clinical movement have persuasively argued that primarily (or
perhaps, only) through a clinical or practical setting
can a student acquire a deeper theoretical understanding and examine "some of the most basic questions
about the relation to the legal order of language,
symbol, myth and social consciousness."" Theories
such as these gave the Ford Foundation and CLEPR the
rationale for providing the seed money for the clinical
movement.' 2
My short tenure as a law teacher and my
experience in legal services programs working with
recent law school graduates and their inadequacies,
both real and imagined, has confirmed for me the
need for and worth of clinical education.
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interpersonal skills all must be coordinated within the
ubiquitous constraints of time. The ethical dilemmas
which pervade the lawyers relationships with clients,
peers, courts and society in general are experienced.
The Code of Professional Responsibility's broad and
sometimes inconsistant mandates are confronted.
Choices are made and the student must live with the
consequences.
The advantages of clinical legal education are at
this time mostly just possibilities. Law schools, even
the richest, have a finite amount of money to spend.
The student-faculty ratio which is a prerequisite for
the learning experience described above, is not within
the ability of law schools as presently structured.
There is great pressure to expend resources and time
on the study of the ever expanding body of the law and
its concomitant complexity. The other side of the
equation also presents problems. The present day
practice of law in many areas does not lend itself to
either student participation or controllable and
meaningful educational experience.
It seems clear to me that there needs to be some
significant changes in both legal education and the
practice of law. Law schools have started to respond
by experimenting with new methods. The process has
begun to try to find a creative way to realistically use
the tensions between the academic and the practical,
and the case and lecture method and the clinical. This
process opens up exciting possibilities for ideas and
input from all.
It is perhaps obvious that the students who came
into my office inquiring about third-year practice, left
with some feeling of bewilderment. The exact
responses to their concerns are far from clear.

7. Stevens, supra note 4, at 51.
8. "Intellegent men (sic) can learn that dialectical
technique in about six months." J. Frank, Courts
on Trial 237 (1949).
9. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
10. E. Johnson, Justice and Reform, 1975,
11. Bellow, On Teaching The Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections On Clinical Education As
Methodology, in Clinical Education For The Law
Student 397 (1973).
12. Marden, CLEPR: Origins And Program, in Clinical
Education For The Law Student 3 (1973).
13. Bellow, supra note 11, at 395.
14. Watson, On Teaching Lawyers Professionalism: A
Continuing Psychiatric Analysis, in Clinical Education For The Law Student 141 (1973).
15. Bellow, supra note 11. at 379.

John Levy

FOOTNOTES
1. See generally, 3 Learning And The Law No. 2
(Summer 1976).
2. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against
Himself, 54 Va. L. Rev. 637 (1968). Bergin uses the
phrase "pure academic or pure Hessiantrainer."
3. There are a few states which still allow reading law
as an alternative to law school as a prerequisite to
taking the bar exam. Virginia does, at present.
provide for this route. Section 54-62(2), Code of
Virginia; Rule 8.C. Rule of the Virginia Board of Bar
Examiners. However, the Virginia General Assembly appears to be on the verge of removing this
option.

JOHN LEVY

John Levy, during the past year, has been
Director of Clinical Education and Visiting Associate
Professor of Law at Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg,
Virginia. Prior to this year, he was the Director of the
Neighborhood Legal Aid Society, Inc. in Richmond,
Virginia.
After receiving his B.A. degree from New York
University, Mr. Levy joined the Peace Corps and
served in Nigeria where he taught English and African
History in a secondary school. Following his tour in
Nigeria, Mr. Levy returned to Syracuse University to
work on his Juris Doctor degree which he received in
1968.

4. Stevens, Legal Education: Historical Perspectives,
in Clinical Education For The Law Student 43 (1973);
J. Auerbach, Unequal Justice (1976).
5. Manning, Nose to Nose with Experience, 3 Learning
And The Law 58 (1976); McClain, Is Legal Education
Doing Its Job? A Reply, 39 ABA Journal 120 (1953).
6. Auerbach, Unequal Justice (1976). Auerbach presents a convincing case that a major factor in the
growth of university based law schools was racism
(or in Auerbach's terms "ethnicity.")
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The Colonial Lawyer is published at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary. The opinions expressed are those of the writers and do not
necessarily reflect the position of the school.
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